Manlove and O 'Malley [8] proposed the Student-Project Allocation Problem with Preferences over Projects (SPA-P). They proved that the problem of finding a maximum stable matching in SPA-P is APX-hard and gave a polynomial-time 2-approximation algorithm. In this paper, we give an improved upper bound of 1.5 and a lower bound of 21/19 (> 1.1052).
Introduction
Assignment problems based on the preferences of participants, which originated from the famous Hospitals/Residents problem (HR) [3] , are important ✩ A preliminary version of this paper was presented at the 8th Annual Conference on Theory and Applications of Models of Computation, TAMC 2011. This work was supported by KAKENHI 22240001 and 20700009.
almost everywhere, such as in education systems where students must be allocated to elementary schools or university students to projects. In the university case, each student may have preferences over certain research projects supervised by professors and usually there is an upper bound on the number of students each project can accept. Our basic goal is to find a "stable" allocation where no students (or projects or professors if they also have preferences over students) can complain of unfairness. This notion of stability was first introduced by Gale and Shapley in the context of the famous Stable Marriage problem in 1962 [2] .
The Student-Project Allocation problem (SPA) is a typical formulation of this kind of problem originally described by Abraham, Irving, and Manlove [1] . The participants here are students, projects, and lecturers. Each project is offered by a single lecturer, though one lecturer may offer multiple projects. Each project and each lecturer has a capacity. Students have preferences over projects, and lecturers have preferences over students. Our goal is to find a stable matching between students and projects satisfying all of the capacity constraints for projects and lecturers. They proved that all stable matchings for a single instance have the same size, and proposed linear-time algorithms to find one [1] .
Manlove and O'Malley [8] proposed a variant of SPA, called SPA with Preferences over Projects (SPA-P), where lecturers have preferences over projects they offer rather than preferences over students. In contrast to SPA, they pointed out that the sizes of stable matchings may differ, and proved that the problem of finding a maximum stable matching in SPA-P, denoted MAX-SPA-P, is APX-hard. They also presented a polynomial-time 2-approximation algorithm. Specifically, they provided a polynomial-time algorithm that finds a stable matching, and proved that any two stable matchings differ in size by at most a factor of two.
Our Contributions. In this paper, we improve both the upper and lower bounds on the approximation ratio for MAX-SPA-P. We give an upper bound of 1.5 and a lower bound of 21/19 (> 1.1052) (under the condition that P = NP). For the upper bound, we modify Manlove and O'Malley's algorithm spa-p-approx [8] using Király's idea [7] for the approximation algorithm to find a maximum stable matching in a variant of the stable marriage problem (MAX-SMTI). We also show that our analysis is tight. For the lower bound, we give a gap-preserving reduction from (a variant of) MAX-SMTI. Our reduction also gives a lower bound of 1.25 under the Unique Games Conjecture.
Preliminaries
Here we give a formal definition of SPA-P and MAX-SPA-P, derived directly from the literature [8] . An instance I of SPA-P consists of a set S of students, a set P of projects, and a set L of lecturers. Each lecturer k ∈ L offers a subset P k of projects. Each project is offered by exactly one lecturer, i.e.,
Each student s i ∈ S has an acceptable set of projects, denoted A i , and has a strict order on A i according to preferences. Each lecturer k also has a strict order on P k according to preferences. Also, each project p j and each lecturer k has a positive integer, called a capacity, denoted c j and d k , respectively.
An assignment M is a subset of S × P where ( For s ∈ S, let M(s) be the set of projects to which s is assigned in M. For r ∈ P ∪ L, let M(r) be the set of students assigned to r in M. If M(s i ) = ∅, we say that the student s i is unassigned in M, otherwise s i is assigned in M. We say that the project p j is under-subscribed, full, or over-subscribed with respect to M according to whether [8] for the validity of this definition of stability. SPA-P is the problem of finding a stable matching, and MAX-SPA-P is the problem of finding a maximum stable matching.
We say that A is an r-approximation algorithm if it satisfies OP T (I)/A(I) ≤ r for all instances I, where OP T (I) and A(I) are the sizes of the optimal and the algorithm's solutions for I, respectively.
Approximability

Algorithm SPA-P-APPROX-PROMOTION
Manlove and O'Malley's algorithm spa-p-approx [8] proceeds as follows. First, all students are unassigned. Any student (s) who has non-empty preference list applies to the top project (p) on the current list of s. If the lecturer ( ) who offers p has no incentive to accept s for p, then s is rejected. When rejected, s deletes p from the list. Otherwise, (s, p) is added to the current matching. If, as a result, becomes over-subscribed, rejects a student from 's worst non-empty project to satisfy the capacity constraint. This continues until there is no unassigned student whose preference list is non-empty. Manlove and O'Malley proved that the obtained matching is stable. We extend spa-p-approx using Király's idea [7] . During the execution of our algorithm spa-p-approx-promotion, each student has one of two states, "unpromoted" or "promoted". At the beginning, all of the students are unpromoted. The application sequence is unchanged. When a student (s) becomes unassigned with her preference list exhausted, s is promoted. When promoted, s returns to her original preference list (i.e., all of the previous deletions are canceled) and starts a second sequence of applications from the top of her list. For the decision rule for acceptance or rejection by the lecturers, they will prefer promoted students to unpromoted students within the same project. The formal description of spa-p-approx-promotion is given as Algorithm 1.
When a student s i applies to a project p j but is instantly rejected, we say that p j rejects s i and s i is rejected by p j . Similarly, when a student s i being assigned to p j is rejected (due to another student's application), we say that p j rejects s i and s i is rejected by p j .
Correctness
It is straightforward to show that spa-p-approx-promotion outputs a matching in polynomial time. We will now show that the output matching M is stable. We first prove two useful lemmas: Lemma 3.1. Suppose that, during the execution of spa-p-approx-promotion, a project p a rejected a promoted student. Then (i) after that point, no student can be accepted to p a , and (ii) no unpromoted student can be assigned to p a in M.
Proof. Suppose that a promoted student s is rejected by p a . Let k be the lecturer who offers p a . It is easy to see that just after this rejection, no unpromoted student can be assigned to p a . We show that after that point, if a student s applies to p a when there is no unpromoted student assigned to p a , then s must be rejected. It is easy to see that the lemma follows by using this fact inductively.
Note that just after this rejection, either (1) p a is full or (2) p a is undersubscribed and k is full. We consider Case (2) first. Since p a is undersubscribed but s was rejected by p a , just before this rejection p a must be k 's worst non-empty project or even worse than k 's worst non-empty project. Then after this rejection, p a remains k 's worst non-empty project or worse than that. Note that now k remains full until the end of the execution. Then after this point, when any student applies to p a , only Cases A (line 10) or B (line 16) of the algorithm can apply. Since there is no unpromoted student in M(p a ), s must be rejected.
In Case (1), if p a is still full when s applies to p a , Case A of the algorithm applies and hence s must be rejected since M(p a ) contains no unpromoted student. If p a is under-subscribed when s applies to p a , then some student was already rejected by p a . At that time, k must have been full and p a was k 's worst non-empty project. Therefore, k is still full and p a is k 's worst non-empty project or worse than k 's worst non-empty project. Then we can apply the same argument as in Case (2).
Lemma 3.2.
Suppose that, during the execution of spa-p-approx-promotion, a project p a has rejected a student. Then after that point, no unpromoted student can be accepted to p a .
Proof. The proof is basically similar to that of the previous lemma, and hence we give only a brief sketch. Let k be the lecturer who offers p a . After the rejection point, k or p a is full. If k is full but p a is under-subscribed, then p a must be k 's worst non-empty project or worse than that. Then, afterwards, k has no incentive to accept an unpromoted student to p a . Next, suppose that p a is full after the rejection point. As long as p a remains full, p a rejects an unpromoted student. If p a becomes under-subscribed, then k must be full and p a is k 's worst non-empty project or worse than that. Hence we can apply the same argument as the former case.
To prove the stability, we need to prove that there is no coalition or blocking pair.
Lemma 3.3. The output matching M is coalition-free.
Proof. Suppose that there is a coalition {s
. Thus s i j prefers p i j+1 to p i j (where j + 1 is taken modulo r). Therefore, at some point of the execution, p i j+1 was deleted from s i j 's list. Note that during the execution of the algorithm, one project may be deleted from a student's list twice (because of a promotion). Hereafter, a "deletion" means the final deletion unless otherwise stated. Now suppose without loss of generality that among such deletions, the first occurrence was the deletion of p i 1 The following lemma follows immediately from Lemmas 3.3 and 3.4.
Lemma 3.5. spa-p-approx-promotion returns a stable matching.
Analysis of the Approximation Ratio
For a given instance I, let M be a matching output from spa-p-approxpromotion, and let M opt be a largest stable matching for I. 
|M|.
Proof. Based on M and M opt , we define a bipartite graph G M,Mopt = (U, V, E) as follows: Each vertex in U corresponds to a student in I, and each vertex in V corresponds to a position of a project in I. Precisely speaking, for each project p j whose capacity is c j , we create c j "positions" of p j , each of which can accept at most one student, and each vertex in V corresponds to each such position. We use s i to denote the vertex in U corresponding to a student s i and p j,1 , p j, Then s i applied to p a when promoted, but was rejected. Therefore s j must be promoted by Lemma 3.1(ii). This means that s j applied to p b at least once, but was rejected. Let k be the lecturer who offers p b . As mentioned several times before, this rejection can happen only when (1) p b is full or (2) k is full and p b is k 's worst non-empty project or worse than that, and either (1) or (2) Note that in both of these cases, we used the property that k is full in M. This implies that for each Type-I or Type-II component, we can find a distinct vertex in V which is matched only in M to perform the above mentioned replacement. We do this replacement for all Type-I and Type-II components in G M,Mopt . This operation does not change any M-edges, so the number of students assigned to each lecturer or project in M is unchanged. In particular, a lecturer or a project full in M is still full in the modified graph.
As The following theorem follows immediately from Lemmas 3.5 and 3.6. Theorem 3.7. spa-p-approx-promotion is a 1.5-approximation algorithm for MAX-SPA-P.
Tightness of the Analysis
We give an instance to show that our analysis of the approximation ratio is tight. There are three students s 1 , s 2 , and s 3 and one lecturer 1 with d 1 = 3.
Lecturer 1 offers three projects p 1 , p 2 , and p 3 , where c 1 = c 2 = c 3 = 1. The preferences of the students and the lecturer are as follows:
Note that the matching {(s 1 , p 1 ), (s 2 , p 2 ), (s 3 , p 3 )} of size three is stable, but the following execution of spa-p-approx-promotion yields a stable matching of size two {(s 2 , p 1 ), (s 3 , p 2 )}: 
Promoting Many Times
In the course of spa-p-approx-promotion, each student is promoted at most once. One of the natural extensions is then to let a student be promoted more than once, where a student with more promotions is more preferred (within the same project). Unfortunately, however, we have a simple example to show that this extension does not improve the approximation ratio. There are three students s 1 , s 2 , s 3 , three lecturers 1 , 2 , 3 , and four projects, p 1 and p 2 offered by 1 , p 3 offered by 2 , and p 4 offered by 3 . All of the capacities of lecturers and projects are one. Preference lists are defined as follows:
First note that {(s 1 , p 2 ), (s 2 , p 3 ), (s 3 , p 4 )} of size three is a maximum stable matching. Now, consider the following execution of the extended algorithm:
1. s 3 applies to p 3 and is accepted. 2. s 2 applies to p 3 and is rejected. 3. s 2 applies to p 1 and is accepted.
Then, afterwards, no matter how many times s 1 is promoted, s 1 will be rejected by p 2 . Hence the extended algorithm produces a stable matching of size two. Note that this is also another tight example for Section 3.4.
Inapproximability
We first define the following optimization variant of the stable marriage problem, which we call MAX-SMTI-1T (abbreviation of "Maximum stable marriage problem with ties and incomplete lists with one-sided ties"). In an input, we have sets of men and women. Each man has an acceptable set of women, whom he is willing to be matched with, and has a preference list that orders his acceptable women in a strict order. Similarly, each woman has an acceptable set of men, and has a preference list for them. The women's preference lists may contain ties, meaning that two or more men in the same tie are considered to be of equal preference for her. A matching is a set of disjoint (man, 
N.
We prove a similar hardness for MAX-SPA-P by a reduction from MAX-SMTI-1T. For an instance I of MAX-SPA-P, let OP T (I ) be the size of a maximum stable matching for I . For each man m i of I, we create a student s i of I , and for each woman w j of I, we create a lecturer j of I . For each woman w j , let T j,1 , T j,2 , . . . , T j,t be the ties in w j 's preference list in the order of preference, where a man not in a tie is considered as a tie of size one. Then, we create projects p j,1 , p j,2 , . . . , p j,t that are offered by j , where j 's preference list includes these projects in this order. Suppose that in I, a man m i includes a woman w j at the dth position in his list, and m i is in a tie T j,k of woman w j 's list. Then, in I , student s i includes the project p j,k at the dth position of the list. The capacity of each lecturer and each project is one. This completes the reduction. It is not hard to see that the reduction can be done in polynomial time. To illustrate the reduction, we give an example of MAX-SMTI-1T instance I in Fig. 1 and corresponding MAX-SPA-P instance I in Fig. 2 . In a woman's list in Fig. 1 , men in the same tie are included in parenthesis. 
Note that an application of this operation does not change the matching size. Also, note that no new blocking pair is created because no one becomes worse off. We apply this operation as long as there is a coalition. This sequence of operations must terminate in finite number of steps because at least two students become better off by one application. Hence at the termination, we have a stable matching of size |M |.
Next we show (B). Let M be a stable matching for I . We construct a matching M of I as follows: If a student s i is assigned to a project p j,k in M , then a man m i is matched with a woman w j in M (note that w j is in m i 's list by construction). If s i is unassigned in M , then m i is unmatched in M. Again, it is easy to see that M is a stable matching and |M| = |M |. This completes the proof. Suppose that there is a polynomial-time approximation algorithm T for MAX-SPA-P whose approximation ratio is at most 21/19 − δ for some δ. Then consider these conditions with fixed constant such that < 361δ 360−171δ
. If an instance of Case (1) is given to T , it outputs a solution whose size is at least (2), which implies P=NP. This completes the proof.
As mentioned in Remark 3.6 of [4] , MAX-SMTI-1T is hard to approximate within 1.25 − δ for any positive constant δ if Minimum Vertex Cover problem is hard to approximate within 2 − for any positive constant (note that the "if-part" is true if the Unique Games Conjecture is true [6] ). Using the reduction in the proof of Theorem 4.2, we can prove the same hardness for MAX-SPA-P: Proof. Suppose that, for some δ , there is a polynomial-time (1.25 − δ )-approximation algorithm A for MAX-SPA-P. Then, the following algorithm B is a polynomial-time (1.25 − δ )-approximation algorithm for MAX-SMTI-1T: Given an instance I of MAX-SMTI-1T, B first translates it to an instance I of MAX-SPA-P using the reduction in the proof of Theorem 4.2. It then solves I using A and obtains a solution M , and transforms it to a solution M of I in the same manner as given in the proof of Theorem 4.2. Then, by Remark 3.6 of [4] , there is a polynomial-time (2 − )-approximation algorithm for Minimum Vertex Cover problem for some , which contradicts our assumption.
Conclusions
In this paper, we improved the upper and lower bounds on the approximation ratio for MAX-SPA-P. One research direction is to further improve the upper bound. For example, a state of the art approximation algorithm for MAX-SMTI-1T [5] generalizes Király's idea [7] using a Linear Programming approach. Its approximation ratio of 25/17( 1.4706) is slightly better than 1.5. One possible next step is to verify whether this idea can be applied to spa-p-approx-promotion.
